Philip Gerrans

Research Interests

Philosophy of Cognition

Prof Philip Gerrans

Professor

School of Humanities

College of Creative Arts, Design and Humanities

Eligible to supervise Masters and PhD - email supervisor to discuss availability.

My main research interest is the use of psychological disorder to study the mind. I have written on developmental disorders (autism and Williams syndrome), cognitive neuropsychiatry, on moral psychopathologies (such as psychopathology) and the emotions. I have published two monographs on psychiatric disorders, on on delusion and irrationality and one on disorders of self representation. I am an Associate of the Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences where I collaborate with philosophers psychologists and neuroscientists. In 2024  Chris Letheby and I and published an edited collection on philosophical issues raised by the nature of psychedelic experience. In all these cases my focus is on the role of computational models linking experience to neural processing.  I have two current related projects (i)  the nature of  neural self representation within the active inference framework, with an emphasis on developmental trauma. (ii) the computational architecture of pain and suffering in biological and artificial minds. In 2026 I will be a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College and a Visitor to PAIR (The Centre for Philosophy of AI Research) Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg)

My main research interest is the use of psychological disorder to study the mind. I have written on developmental disorders (autism and Williams syndrome), cognitive neuropsychiatry, on moral psychopathologies (such as psychopathology) and the emotions. I have published two monographs on psychiatric disorders, on on delusion and irrationality and one on disorders of self representation. I am an Associate of the Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences where I collaborate with philosophers psychologists and neuroscientists.   in 2024  Chris Letheby and published an edited collection philosophical issues raised by the nature of psychedelic experience. In all these cases my focus is on the role of computational models linking experience to neural processing.  I have two current related projects (i)  the nature of  neural self representation within the active inference framework, with an emphasis on developmental trauma. (ii) the computational architecture of pain and suffering in biological and artificial minds. In 2026 I will be a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College and a Visitor to PAIR (The Centre for Philosophy of AI Research) Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg)

 

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Date Position Institution name
2018 - ongoing VIsiting Professor Mahidol University International College
2018 - ongoing Visiting Professor Swiss Centre For Affective Sciences
2003 - ongoing VIsiting Professor Simon Fraser University

Year Citation
2024 Gerrans, P. (2024). Pain suffering and the self. An active allostatic inference explanation. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2024(1), niae002.
DOI Scopus3 WoS3 Europe PMC1
2023 Gerrans, P. (2023). A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence. Mind and Language, 38(4), 1059-1080.
DOI Scopus7 WoS3
2022 Gerrans, P. (2022). Alienation and identification in addiction. Philosophical Psychology, 37(3), 23 pages.
DOI Scopus1 WoS2
2020 Gerrans, P. (2020). Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 523710.
DOI Scopus19 WoS16 Europe PMC10
2020 Gerrans, P., & Murray, R. J. (2020). Interoceptive active inference and self-representation in social anxiety disorder (SAD): exploring the neurocognitive traits of the SAD self. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2020(1), niaa026-1-niaa026-12.
DOI Scopus13 WoS10 Europe PMC8
2019 Humpston, C. S., Adams, R. A., Benrimoh, D., Broome, M. R., Corlett, P. R., Gerrans, P., . . . Linden, D. E. J. (2019). From Computation to the First-Person: Auditory-Verbal Hallucinations and Delusions of Thought Interference in Schizophrenia-Spectrum Psychoses. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 45(45 Suppl 1), S56-S66.
DOI Scopus22 WoS18 Europe PMC15
2019 Gerrans, P. (2019). Depersonalization Disorder, Affective Processing and Predictive Coding. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(2), 401-418.
DOI Scopus33 WoS30
2017 Gerrans, P. (2017). Alien Landscapes? Interpreting Disordered Minds. AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 95(2), 400-402.
DOI
2017 Gerrans, P., & Kennett, J. (2017). Mental time travel, dynamic evaluation, and moral agency. Mind, 126(501), 259-268.
DOI Scopus5 WoS7
2017 Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2017). Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2017(1), nix016-1-nix016-11.
DOI WoS164 Europe PMC90
2015 Murray, R., Gerrans, P., Brosch, T., & Sander, D. (2015). When at rest: Event-free active inference may give rise to implicit self-models of coping potential. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, e114.
DOI Scopus2 WoS2 Europe PMC1
2014 Gerrans, P. (2014). Pathologies of hyperfamiliarity in dreams, delusions and déjà vu. Frontiers in Psychology, 5(FEB), 97-1-97-10.
DOI Scopus34 WoS21 Europe PMC11
2014 Gerrans, P. (2014). Mixed-trait menu. Tls the Times Literary Supplement, (5809), 28.
2014 Gerrans, P. (2014). MORAL CHARACTER An empirical theory. TLS-THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, (5809), 28.
2014 Gerrans, P., & Sander, D. (2014). Feeling the future: prospects for a theory of implicit prospection. Biology & Philosophy, 29(5), 699-710.
DOI Scopus12 WoS4
2013 Gerrans, P. (2013). Imitation, mind reading, and social learning. Biological Theory, 8(1), 20-27.
DOI Scopus6
2013 Gerrans, P., & Scherer, K. (2013). Wired for despair: the neurochemistry of emotion and the phenomenology of depression. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20(7-8), 254-268.
Scopus10 WoS13
2013 Gerrans, P. (2013). Unraveling the mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 214-215.
DOI Scopus2 WoS2 Europe PMC1
2013 Gerrans, P. (2013). Delusional attitudes and default thinking. Mind & Language, 28(1), 83-102.
DOI Scopus20 WoS17
2013 Gerrans, P., & Mulligan, K. (2013). Immaginazione, default thinking e incorporamento. Revista de Estetica, 53(53), 55-87.
2013 Gerrans, P., & Mulligan, K. (2013). Imagination, default thinking and integration. Rivista Di Estetica, 53(3), 239-271.
DOI Scopus2
2013 Gerrans, P., & Mulligan, K. (2013). IMAGINATION, <i>DEFAULT THINKING</i> AND EMBEDDING. RIVISTA DI ESTETICA, 53(3), 239-271.
WoS1
2012 Gerrans, P. (2012). Experience and Expectations: Bayesian Explanations of the Alternation Between the Capgras and Cotard Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 19(2), 145-148.
DOI Scopus3 WoS3
2012 Gerrans, P. (2012). Dream experience and a revisionist account of delusions of misidentification. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 217-227.
DOI Scopus14 WoS7 Europe PMC2
2010 Gerrans, P., & Kennett, J. (2010). Neurosentimentalism and moral agency. Mind, 119(475), 585-614.
DOI Scopus33 WoS31
2010 Gerrans, P. (2010). Mirror neuron systems: The role of mirroring processes in social cognition. COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY, 15(5), 501-504.
DOI WoS1
2009 Gerrans, P. (2009). Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, ed., Moral Psychology Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008, pp. xviii + 585, US$30 (paper) (Review). Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87(3), 525-528.
DOI
2008 Gerrans, P., & Stone, V. (2008). Generous or parsimonious cognitive architecture? Cognitive neuroscience and Theory of Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(2), 121-141.
DOI Scopus22 WoS17
2007 Gerrans, P. (2007). Mental time travel, somatic markers and “myopia for the future”. Synthese, 159(3), 459-474.
DOI Scopus22 WoS15
2007 Gerrans, P. (2007). Mechanisms of madness: evolutionary psychiatry without evolutionary psychology. Biology & Philosophy, 22(1), 35-56.
DOI Scopus11 WoS12
2006 Gerrans, P., & Kennett, J. (2006). Is cognitive penetrability the mark of the moral?. Philosophical Explorations, 9(1), 3-12.
DOI Scopus15
2006 Gerrans, P. (2006). La lecture de pensee pour debutants. Philosophiques, 33(1), 125-146.
2006 Stone, V., & Gerrans, P. (2006). Does the normal brain have a theory of mind?. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(1), 3-4.
DOI Scopus18 WoS18 Europe PMC9
2006 Stone, V., & Gerrans, P. (2006). What's domain-specific about theory of mind?. Social Neuroscience, 1(3-4), 309-319.
DOI Scopus108 WoS99 Europe PMC60
2005 Gerrans, P. (2005). Tacit knowledge, rule following and Pierre Bourdieu's philosophy of social science. Anthropological Theory, 5(1), 53-74.
DOI Scopus32
2004 Gerrans, P. (2004). Individualism and cognitive development. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(1), 107-108.
DOI Scopus1
2004 Gerrans, P. (2004). Cognitive architecture and the limits of interpretationism. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 11(1), 43-48.
DOI
2004 Gerrans, P. (2004). The disposition of things: spontaneous order in the esprit des lois.. The European Legacy, 9(6), 751-765.
DOI
2004 Cullity, G., & Gerrans, P. (2004). Agency and policy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104(1), 315-327.
DOI Scopus6
2004 Cullity, G., & Gerrans, P. (2004). Agency and Policy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 104(1), 317-327.
DOI
2004 Gerrans, P. (2004). Individualism and cognitive development. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 27(1), 107-108.
2003 Gerrans, P. (2003). Multiple paths to delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 9(1), 65-72.
DOI
2003 Akins, K., & Gerrans, P. (2003). Introduction. Biology & Philosophy, 18(1), 1-11.
DOI
2003 Gerrans, P. (2003). The motor of cognition. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4), 510-512.
DOI Scopus3 WoS1
2003 Gerrans, P. (2003). Nativism and neuroconstructivism in the explanation of Williams syndrome. Biology & Philosophy, 18(1), 41-52.
DOI Scopus10 WoS4
2002 Gerrans, P. (2002). The theory of mind module in evolutionary psychology. Biology & Philosophy, 17(3), 305-321.
DOI Scopus42 WoS34
2002 Gerrans, P. (2002). Modularity reconsidered. Language & Communication, 22(3), 259-268.
DOI Scopus16 WoS8
2002 Gerrans, P. (2002). Nativism, neuroconstructivism and developmental disorder. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 757-758.
DOI Scopus1 WoS1
2002 Gerrans, P. (2002). A one-stage explanation of the Cotard delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 9(1), 47-53.
DOI
2001 Gerrans, P. (2001). Delusions as performance failures. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 6(3), 161-174.
DOI Scopus33 Europe PMC5
2001 Gerrans, P. (2001). Authorship and ownership of thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 8(2-3), 231-238.
DOI
2000 Gerrans, P. (2000). Refining the explanation of Cotard's delusion. Mind & Language, 15(1), 111-122.
DOI Scopus48 WoS34
1998 Gerrans, P. (1998). The norms of cognitive development. Mind and Language, 13(1), 56-75.
DOI Scopus9 WoS5
1998 Gerrans, P. (1998). How to be a conformist, part II. Simulation and rule following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76(4), 566-586.
DOI Scopus2
- Gerrans, P. (2006). The reading of thought for beginners. PHILOSOPHIQUES, 33(1), 125-145.
DOI

Year Citation
2024 Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (Eds.) (2024). Philosophical Perspectives on the Psychedelic Renaissance. Oxford University Press.
2024 Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2024). Philosophical perspectives on psychedelic psychiatry. Oxford University PressOxford.
DOI Scopus2
2014 Gerrans, P. (2014). The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience and Delusional Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Scopus93

Year Citation
2024 Gerrans, P. (2024). Cotard syndrome: The experience of inexistence. In E. Sullivan-Bissett (Ed.), Belief, Imagination, and Delusion (pp. 181-204). Oxford University PressOxford.
DOI Scopus2
2024 Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2024). Introduction: Philosophy and psychedelic psychiatry. In C. Letheby, & P. Gerrans (Eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Psychedelic Psychiatry (pp. 1-22). Oxford University Press.
DOI
2024 Gerrans, P. (2024). The self as avatar: An active inference account of ego dissolution. In C. Letheby, & P. Gerrans (Eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Psychedelic Psychiatry (pp. 44-67). Oxford University Press.
DOI
2024 Gerrans, P. (2024). DELUSION AND DREAMING. In E. Sullivan-Bissett (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion (pp. 361-375). Taylor and Francis.
DOI
2023 Gerrans, P. (2023). An Active Inference Account of the Cotard Delusion of Inexistence. In A. Falcato, & J. Goncalves (Eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Delusions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (pp. 142-160). Routledge.
DOI
2018 Gerrans, P. (2018). Painful memories. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus, & D. Perrin (Eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory (pp. 158-178). New York, NY; USA: Routledge.
DOI Scopus3
2015 Gerrans, P. (2015). Passivity experience in schizophrenia. In R. Gennaro (Ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness (pp. 325-345). United States of America: MIT Press.
2014 Gerrans, P. (2014). Singular thoughts, seeing doubles and delusional misidentification. In A. Reboul (Ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan - Volume 2 (pp. 235-248). Switzerland: Springer.
DOI
2009 Gerrans, P. (2009). Imitation and theory of mind. In G. Berntson, & J. Cacioppopp (Eds.), Handbook of neuroscience for the behavioral sciences (pp. 905-922). New Jersey, USA: Wiley.
2009 Gerrans, P. (2009). Mad scientists or unreliable autobiographers? Dopamine dysregulation and delusion. In M. Broome, & L. Bortolotti (Eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical perspectives (1 ed., pp. 151-172). New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
2009 Gerrans, P. (2009). From phenomenology to cognitive architecture and back. In T. Bayne, & J. Fernandez (Eds.), Delusion and self-deception. Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief formation (pp. 127-138). United States: Psychology Press.
DOI Scopus1 WoS1
2008 Gerrans, P. (2008). Montesquieu's anti-utopian political theory. In John West Sooby (Ed.), Nowhere is perfect: French and francophone utopias/dystopias (pp. 11-26). Australia: University of Delaware Press.
2003 Gerrans, P., & McGeer, V. (2003). Theory of mind in autism and schizophrenia: A case of overoptimistic reverse engineering. In B. Repacholi, & V. Slaughter (Eds.), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind Implications for Typical and Atypical Development (pp. 269-302). Psychology Press.
DOI Scopus2
2003 Gerrans, P., & McGeer, V. (2003). Theory of mind in autism and schizophrenia: a case of over-optimistic reverse engineering. In B. Repacholi, & V. Slaughter (Eds.), Individual differences in theory of mind - implications for typical and atypical development (pp. 271-304). 27 Church Rd, Hove, East Sussex BN3 2FA: Psychology Press.

Year Citation
2016 Gerrans, P. S. (2016). The Default Mode Network and the cognitive architecture of belief fixation. A new approach to the one stage -two stage debate about delusion formation. In INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY Vol. 51 (pp. 88). ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD.
2006 Gerrans, P. (2006). A neurocomputational model of delusion. In R. Manzotti (Ed.), Proceedings of BICS 06 (pp. CDROM1-CDROM9). CDROM: Interdisciplinary Research Canada.

Year Citation
2022 Nailer, T. (2022). Moral Agency. (Master's Thesis, The University of Adelaide).

FUTURE FELLOWSHIP 

 

FT 110101050 The Emotional Architecture of Self Representation for the years 2012-2015. The project integrates and extends a decade of work on developmental and psychiatric disorder and emotions to help explain the relationship between emotional processes and disorders of the self.  Funding  $774,000

 

AUSTRALIAN RESEARCH COUNCIL DISCOVERY GRANTS

Since 2003 I have been awarded 4 ARC Discovery Grants. 

 

DP190101451: Philosophical Perspectives on Psychedelic Psychiatry. Funding $534,000

 

DP0988514: A model of the mind which explains the role of emotions in normal cognition and affective disorder. Funding: $163,000 

 

DP0451655 : The Structure of Moral Reasoning: Hume, Kant and the Evidence from Psychopathology and Neuroscience.  Funding $199, 532. 

 

DP0559464: Philosophy and Cognitive Neuropsychiatry: Delusions as a case study for an integrative neurocomputational theory of rationality. Funding $194, 811

 

Junior Member, McDonnell Project in the Philosophy of Neuroscience. 2000- 2005.

Australian Research Council Australian Postdoctoral Fellowship. 2000 (Declined)

Adelaide University URG 2001.

ARC Small Grant 2002.

 ARC Small Grant 2003.

ARC Small Grant 2004

Date Role Research Topic Program Degree Type Student Load Student Name
2025 Co-Supervisor The Physical Basis of Consciousness Doctor of Philosophy Doctorate Full Time Prof Keith Dear
2025 Co-Supervisor Moral Beings Doctor of Philosophy Doctorate Part Time Mr Timothy Nailer
2025 Co-Supervisor The Physical Basis of Consciousness Doctor of Philosophy Doctorate Full Time Prof Keith Dear
2025 Co-Supervisor Moral Beings Doctor of Philosophy Doctorate Full Time Mr Timothy Nailer
2024 Principal Supervisor Active Inference and Psychiatry Master of Philosophy Master Full Time Mr Samuel Madsen
2024 Principal Supervisor AI and Accountability: Transparency, Explainability, and Accounting for Responsibility
Gaps		 Doctor of Philosophy Doctorate Full Time Mr Michael Lazarou
2024 Principal Supervisor AI and Accountability: Transparency, Explainability, and Accounting for Responsibility
Gaps		 Doctor of Philosophy Doctorate Full Time Mr Michael Lazarou
2024 Principal Supervisor Active Inference and Psychiatry Master of Philosophy Master Full Time Mr Samuel Madsen

Date Role Research Topic Program Degree Type Student Load Student Name
2020 - 2022 Co-Supervisor Self-Deception and Wilful Ignorance: ‘Self-induced, purported ignorance?’ Master of Philosophy Master Part Time Ms Margaret Leila Penhall-Jones
2020 - 2022 Principal Supervisor To Blame or Not to Blame: Respect, Fittingness, and Standing Master of Philosophy Master Full Time Mr Henry Littleton Phillips
2020 - 2022 Principal Supervisor Moral Agency Master of Philosophy Master Part Time Mr Timothy Nailer
2011 - 2013 Co-Supervisor Understanding is Simulating: a Defence of Embodied Linguistic Comprehension Master of Philosophy Master Full Time Dr Christopher Edward Ross Letheby
2006 - 2013 Principal Supervisor Moral Competence and the Psychopath Master of Arts Master Part Time Mr Matthew Tieu

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