2024 |
Gerrans, P. (2024). Pain suffering and the self. An active allostatic inference explanation. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2024(1), niae002. DOI |
2023 |
Gerrans, P. (2023). A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence. Mind and Language, 38(4), 1059-1080. DOI Scopus6 |
2022 |
Gerrans, P. (2022). Alienation and identification in addiction. Philosophical Psychology, 37(3), 23 pages. DOI Scopus1 |
2020 |
Gerrans, P. (2020). Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 523710. DOI Scopus17 WoS10 Europe PMC10 |
2020 |
Gerrans, P., & Murray, R. J. (2020). Interoceptive active inference and self-representation in social anxiety disorder (SAD): exploring the neurocognitive traits of the SAD self. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2020(1), 12 pages. DOI Scopus7 Europe PMC1 |
2019 |
Humpston, C. S., Adams, R. A., Benrimoh, D., Broome, M. R., Corlett, P. R., Gerrans, P., . . . Linden, D. E. J. (2019). From Computation to the First-Person: Auditory-Verbal Hallucinations and Delusions of Thought Interference in Schizophrenia-Spectrum Psychoses. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 45(45 Suppl 1), S56-S66. DOI Scopus19 WoS11 Europe PMC8 |
2019 |
Gerrans, P. (2019). Depersonalization Disorder, Affective Processing and Predictive Coding. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(2), 401-418. DOI Scopus29 WoS19 |
2017 |
Gerrans, P. (2017). Alien Landscapes? Interpreting Disordered Minds. AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 95(2), 400-402. DOI |
2017 |
Gerrans, P., & Kennett, J. (2017). Mental time travel, dynamic evaluation, and moral agency. Mind, 126(501), 259-268. DOI Scopus4 WoS6 |
2017 |
Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2017). Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2017(1), nix016-1-nix016-11. DOI WoS71 Europe PMC39 |
2015 |
Murray, R., Gerrans, P., Brosch, T., & Sander, D. (2015). When at rest: Event-free active inference may give rise to implicit self-models of coping potential. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, e114. DOI Scopus2 WoS1 Europe PMC1 |
2014 |
Gerrans, P. (2014). Pathologies of hyperfamiliarity in dreams, delusions and déjà vu. Frontiers in Psychology, 5(FEB), 97-1-97-10. DOI Scopus26 WoS18 Europe PMC9 |
2014 |
Gerrans, P. (2014). Mixed-trait menu. TLS - The Times Literary Supplement, (5809), 28. |
2014 |
Gerrans, P. (2014). MORAL CHARACTER An empirical theory. TLS-THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, (5809), 28. |
2014 |
Gerrans, P., & Sander, D. (2014). Feeling the future: prospects for a theory of implicit prospection. Biology & Philosophy, 29(5), 699-710. DOI Scopus9 WoS4 |
2013 |
Gerrans, P. (2013). Imitation, mind reading, and social learning. Biological Theory, 8(1), 20-27. DOI Scopus5 |
2013 |
Gerrans, P., & Scherer, K. (2013). Wired for despair: the neurochemistry of emotion and the phenomenology of depression. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20(7-8), 254-268. Scopus10 WoS13 |
2013 |
Gerrans, P. (2013). Unraveling the mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 214-215. DOI Scopus2 WoS2 |
2013 |
Gerrans, P. (2013). Delusional attitudes and default thinking. Mind & Language, 28(1), 83-102. DOI Scopus18 WoS16 |
2013 |
Gerrans, P., & Mulligan, K. (2013). Immaginazione, default thinking e incorporamento. Revista de Estetica, 53(53), 55-87. |
2013 |
Gerrans, P., & Mulligan, K. (2013). Imagination, default thinking and integration. Rivista di Estetica, 53(3), 239-271. DOI Scopus2 |
2013 |
Gerrans, P., & Mulligan, K. (2013). IMAGINATION, <i>DEFAULT THINKING</i> AND EMBEDDING. RIVISTA DI ESTETICA, 53(3), 239-271. WoS1 |
2012 |
Gerrans, P. (2012). Experience and Expectations: Bayesian Explanations of the Alternation Between the Capgras and Cotard Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 19(2), 145-148. DOI Scopus3 WoS3 |
2012 |
Gerrans, P. (2012). Dream experience and a revisionist account of delusions of misidentification. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 217-227. DOI Scopus9 WoS6 Europe PMC2 |
2010 |
Gerrans, P., & Kennett, J. (2010). Neurosentimentalism and moral agency. Mind, 119(475), 585-614. DOI Scopus30 WoS29 |
2010 |
Gerrans, P. (2010). Mirror neuron systems: The role of mirroring processes in social cognition. COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY, 15(5), 501-504. DOI WoS1 |
2009 |
Gerrans, P. (2009). Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, ed., Moral Psychology Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008, pp. xviii + 585, US$30 (paper) (Review). Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87(3), 525-528. DOI |
2008 |
Gerrans, P., & Stone, V. (2008). Generous or parsimonious cognitive architecture? Cognitive neuroscience and Theory of Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(2), 121-141. DOI Scopus22 WoS17 |
2007 |
Gerrans, P. (2007). Mental time travel, somatic markers and “myopia for the future”. Synthese, 159(3), 459-474. DOI Scopus22 WoS15 |
2007 |
Gerrans, P. (2007). Mechanisms of madness: evolutionary psychiatry without evolutionary psychology. Biology & Philosophy, 22(1), 35-56. DOI Scopus11 WoS12 |
2006 |
Gerrans, P., & Kennett, J. (2006). Is cognitive penetrability the mark of the moral?. Philosophical Explorations, 9(1), 3-12. DOI Scopus14 |
2006 |
Gerrans, P. (2006). La lecture de pensee pour debutants. Philosophiques, 33(1), 125-146. |
2006 |
Stone, V., & Gerrans, P. (2006). Does the normal brain have a theory of mind?. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(1), 3-4. DOI Scopus18 WoS18 Europe PMC8 |
2006 |
Stone, V., & Gerrans, P. (2006). What's domain-specific about theory of mind?. Social Neuroscience, 1(3-4), 309-319. DOI Scopus106 WoS93 Europe PMC51 |
2005 |
Gerrans, P. (2005). Tacit knowledge, rule following and Pierre Bourdieu's philosophy of social science. Anthropological Theory, 5(1), 53-74. DOI Scopus29 |
2004 |
Gerrans, P. (2004). Individualism and cognitive development. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(1), 107-108. DOI Scopus1 |
2004 |
Gerrans, P. (2004). Cognitive architecture and the limits of interpretationism. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 11(1), 43-48. DOI |
2004 |
Gerrans, P. (2004). The disposition of things: spontaneous order in the esprit des lois.. The European Legacy, 9(6), 751-765. DOI |
2004 |
Cullity, G., & Gerrans, P. (2004). Agency and policy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104(1), 315-327. DOI Scopus6 |
2004 |
Cullity, G., & Gerrans, P. (2004). Agency and Policy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 104(1), 317-327. DOI |
2004 |
Gerrans, P. (2004). Individualism and cognitive development. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 27(1), 107-108. |
2003 |
Gerrans, P. (2003). Multiple paths to delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 9(1), 65-72. DOI |
2003 |
Akins, K., & Gerrans, P. (2003). Introduction. Biology & Philosophy, 18(1), 1-11. DOI |
2003 |
Gerrans, P. (2003). The motor of cognition. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4), 510-512. DOI Scopus2 |
2003 |
Gerrans, P. (2003). Nativism and neuroconstructivism in the explanation of Williams syndrome. Biology & Philosophy, 18(1), 41-52. DOI Scopus10 WoS4 |
2002 |
Gerrans, P. (2002). The theory of mind module in evolutionary psychology. Biology & Philosophy, 17(3), 305-321. DOI Scopus40 WoS34 |
2002 |
Gerrans, P. (2002). Modularity reconsidered. Language & Communication, 22(3), 259-268. DOI Scopus15 WoS8 |
2002 |
Gerrans, P. (2002). Nativism, neuroconstructivism and developmental disorder. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 757-758. DOI Scopus1 WoS1 |
2002 |
Gerrans, P. (2002). A one-stage explanation of the Cotard delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 9(1), 47-53. DOI |
2001 |
Gerrans, P. (2001). Delusions as performance failures. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 6(3), 161-174. DOI Scopus28 Europe PMC4 |
2001 |
Gerrans, P. (2001). Authorship and ownership of thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 8(2-3), 231-238. DOI |
2000 |
Gerrans, P. (2000). Refining the explanation of Cotard's delusion. Mind & Language, 15(1), 111-122. DOI Scopus48 WoS32 |
1998 |
Gerrans, P. (1998). The norms of cognitive development. Mind and Language, 13(1), 56-75. DOI Scopus9 WoS5 |
1998 |
Gerrans, P. (1998). How to be a conformist, part II. Simulation and rule following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76(4), 566-586. DOI Scopus2 |
- |
Gerrans, P. (n.d.). The reading of thought for beginners. PHILOSOPHIQUES, 33(1), 125-145. DOI |