Dr Philip Gerrans

Professor

School of Humanities

Faculty of Arts, Business, Law and Economics

Eligible to supervise Masters and PhD - email supervisor to discuss availability.

My main research interest is the use of psychological disorder to study the mind. I have written on developmental disorders (autism and Williams syndrome), cognitive neuropsychiatry, on moral psychopathologies (such as psychopathology) and the emotions as well as a large monograph and associated series of papers on delusion and disorders of rationality. I am an Associate of the Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences where I collaborate with philosophers psychologists and neuroscientists. Currently I am completing a project on the relationship between emotional processing and self-representation with an emphasis on psychiatric disorders. Chris Letheby and I have just commenced a project on philosophical issues raised by the nature of psychedelic experience. In all these cases my focus is on the role of computational models linking experience to neural processing.

My Research
Career
Publications
Supervision
Contact

My main research interest is the use of psychological disorder to study the mind. I have written on developmental disorders (autism and Williams syndrome), cognitive neuropsychiatry, on moral psychopathologies (such as psychopathology) and the emotions as well as a large monograph and associated series of papers on delusion and disorders of rationality. I am an Associate of the Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences where I collaborate with philosophers psychologists and neuroscientists. In 2024 I completed a manuscript on the relationship between emotional processing and self-representation with an emphasis on psychiatric disorders. Also in 2024 Chris Letheby and published an edited collection philosophical issues raised by the nature of psychedelic experience. In all these cases my focus is on the role of computational models linking experience to neural processing.

Appointments

Date	Position	Institution name
2018 - ongoing	VIsiting Professor	Mahidol University International College
2018 - ongoing	Visiting Professor	Swiss Centre For Affective Sciences
2003 - ongoing	VIsiting Professor	Simon Fraser University

Research Interests

Philosophy of Cognition

Journals

Year	Citation
2024	Gerrans, P. (2024). Pain suffering and the self. An active allostatic inference explanation. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2024(1), niae002. DOI
2023	Gerrans, P. (2023). A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence. Mind and Language, 38(4), 1059-1080. DOI Scopus7
2022	Gerrans, P. (2022). Alienation and identification in addiction. Philosophical Psychology, 37(3), 23 pages. DOI Scopus1
2020	Gerrans, P. (2020). Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 523710. DOI Scopus18 WoS10 Europe PMC10
2020	Gerrans, P., & Murray, R. J. (2020). Interoceptive active inference and self-representation in social anxiety disorder (SAD): exploring the neurocognitive traits of the SAD self. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2020(1), 12 pages. DOI Scopus10 Europe PMC3
2019	Humpston, C. S., Adams, R. A., Benrimoh, D., Broome, M. R., Corlett, P. R., Gerrans, P., . . . Linden, D. E. J. (2019). From Computation to the First-Person: Auditory-Verbal Hallucinations and Delusions of Thought Interference in Schizophrenia-Spectrum Psychoses. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 45(45 Suppl 1), S56-S66. DOI Scopus20 WoS11 Europe PMC8
2019	Gerrans, P. (2019). Depersonalization Disorder, Affective Processing and Predictive Coding. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(2), 401-418. DOI Scopus30 WoS19
2017	Gerrans, P. (2017). Alien Landscapes? Interpreting Disordered Minds. AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 95(2), 400-402. DOI
2017	Gerrans, P., & Kennett, J. (2017). Mental time travel, dynamic evaluation, and moral agency. Mind, 126(501), 259-268. DOI Scopus4 WoS6
2017	Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2017). Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2017(1), nix016-1-nix016-11. DOI WoS71 Europe PMC41
2015	Murray, R., Gerrans, P., Brosch, T., & Sander, D. (2015). When at rest: Event-free active inference may give rise to implicit self-models of coping potential. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, e114. DOI Scopus2 WoS1 Europe PMC1
2014	Gerrans, P. (2014). Pathologies of hyperfamiliarity in dreams, delusions and déjà vu. Frontiers in Psychology, 5(FEB), 97-1-97-10. DOI Scopus30 WoS18 Europe PMC9
2014	Gerrans, P. (2014). Mixed-trait menu. TLS - The Times Literary Supplement, (5809), 28.
2014	Gerrans, P. (2014). MORAL CHARACTER An empirical theory. TLS-THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, (5809), 28.
2014	Gerrans, P., & Sander, D. (2014). Feeling the future: prospects for a theory of implicit prospection. Biology & Philosophy, 29(5), 699-710. DOI Scopus9 WoS4
2013	Gerrans, P. (2013). Imitation, mind reading, and social learning. Biological Theory, 8(1), 20-27. DOI Scopus5
2013	Gerrans, P., & Scherer, K. (2013). Wired for despair: the neurochemistry of emotion and the phenomenology of depression. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20(7-8), 254-268. Scopus10 WoS13
2013	Gerrans, P. (2013). Unraveling the mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 214-215. DOI Scopus2 WoS2
2013	Gerrans, P. (2013). Delusional attitudes and default thinking. Mind & Language, 28(1), 83-102. DOI Scopus20 WoS16
2013	Gerrans, P., & Mulligan, K. (2013). Immaginazione, default thinking e incorporamento. Revista de Estetica, 53(53), 55-87.
2013	Gerrans, P., & Mulligan, K. (2013). Imagination, default thinking and integration. Rivista di Estetica, 53(3), 239-271. DOI Scopus2
2013	Gerrans, P., & Mulligan, K. (2013). IMAGINATION, <i>DEFAULT THINKING</i> AND EMBEDDING. RIVISTA DI ESTETICA, 53(3), 239-271. WoS1
2012	Gerrans, P. (2012). Experience and Expectations: Bayesian Explanations of the Alternation Between the Capgras and Cotard Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 19(2), 145-148. DOI Scopus3 WoS3
2012	Gerrans, P. (2012). Dream experience and a revisionist account of delusions of misidentification. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 217-227. DOI Scopus14 WoS6 Europe PMC2
2010	Gerrans, P., & Kennett, J. (2010). Neurosentimentalism and moral agency. Mind, 119(475), 585-614. DOI Scopus30 WoS29
2010	Gerrans, P. (2010). Mirror neuron systems: The role of mirroring processes in social cognition. COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY, 15(5), 501-504. DOI WoS1
2009	Gerrans, P. (2009). Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, ed., Moral Psychology Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008, pp. xviii + 585, US$30 (paper) (Review). Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87(3), 525-528. DOI
2008	Gerrans, P., & Stone, V. (2008). Generous or parsimonious cognitive architecture? Cognitive neuroscience and Theory of Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(2), 121-141. DOI Scopus22 WoS17
2007	Gerrans, P. (2007). Mental time travel, somatic markers and “myopia for the future”. Synthese, 159(3), 459-474. DOI Scopus22 WoS15
2007	Gerrans, P. (2007). Mechanisms of madness: evolutionary psychiatry without evolutionary psychology. Biology & Philosophy, 22(1), 35-56. DOI Scopus11 WoS12
2006	Gerrans, P., & Kennett, J. (2006). Is cognitive penetrability the mark of the moral?. Philosophical Explorations, 9(1), 3-12. DOI Scopus14
2006	Gerrans, P. (2006). La lecture de pensee pour debutants. Philosophiques, 33(1), 125-146.
2006	Stone, V., & Gerrans, P. (2006). Does the normal brain have a theory of mind?. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(1), 3-4. DOI Scopus18 WoS18 Europe PMC8
2006	Stone, V., & Gerrans, P. (2006). What's domain-specific about theory of mind?. Social Neuroscience, 1(3-4), 309-319. DOI Scopus106 WoS93 Europe PMC51
2005	Gerrans, P. (2005). Tacit knowledge, rule following and Pierre Bourdieu's philosophy of social science. Anthropological Theory, 5(1), 53-74. DOI Scopus29
2004	Gerrans, P. (2004). Individualism and cognitive development. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(1), 107-108. DOI Scopus1
2004	Gerrans, P. (2004). Cognitive architecture and the limits of interpretationism. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 11(1), 43-48. DOI
2004	Gerrans, P. (2004). The disposition of things: spontaneous order in the esprit des lois.. The European Legacy, 9(6), 751-765. DOI
2004	Cullity, G., & Gerrans, P. (2004). Agency and policy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104(1), 315-327. DOI Scopus6
2004	Cullity, G., & Gerrans, P. (2004). Agency and Policy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 104(1), 317-327. DOI
2004	Gerrans, P. (2004). Individualism and cognitive development. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 27(1), 107-108.
2003	Gerrans, P. (2003). Multiple paths to delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 9(1), 65-72. DOI
2003	Akins, K., & Gerrans, P. (2003). Introduction. Biology & Philosophy, 18(1), 1-11. DOI
2003	Gerrans, P. (2003). The motor of cognition. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4), 510-512. DOI Scopus2
2003	Gerrans, P. (2003). Nativism and neuroconstructivism in the explanation of Williams syndrome. Biology & Philosophy, 18(1), 41-52. DOI Scopus10 WoS4
2002	Gerrans, P. (2002). The theory of mind module in evolutionary psychology. Biology & Philosophy, 17(3), 305-321. DOI Scopus41 WoS34
2002	Gerrans, P. (2002). Modularity reconsidered. Language & Communication, 22(3), 259-268. DOI Scopus15 WoS8
2002	Gerrans, P. (2002). Nativism, neuroconstructivism and developmental disorder. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6), 757-758. DOI Scopus1 WoS1
2002	Gerrans, P. (2002). A one-stage explanation of the Cotard delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 9(1), 47-53. DOI
2001	Gerrans, P. (2001). Delusions as performance failures. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 6(3), 161-174. DOI Scopus33 Europe PMC4
2001	Gerrans, P. (2001). Authorship and ownership of thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 8(2-3), 231-238. DOI
2000	Gerrans, P. (2000). Refining the explanation of Cotard's delusion. Mind & Language, 15(1), 111-122. DOI Scopus48 WoS32
1998	Gerrans, P. (1998). The norms of cognitive development. Mind and Language, 13(1), 56-75. DOI Scopus9 WoS5
1998	Gerrans, P. (1998). How to be a conformist, part II. Simulation and rule following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76(4), 566-586. DOI Scopus2
-	Gerrans, P. (n.d.). The reading of thought for beginners. PHILOSOPHIQUES, 33(1), 125-145. DOI

Books

Year	Citation
2024	Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (Eds.) (2024). Philosophical Perspectives on the Psychedelic Renaissance. Oxford University Press.
2024	Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2024). Philosophical perspectives on psychedelic psychiatry. Oxford University PressOxford. DOI
2014	Gerrans, P. (2014). The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience and Delusional Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Scopus83

Book Chapters

Year	Citation
2024	Gerrans, P. (2024). Cotard syndrome: The experience of inexistence. In E. Sullivan-Bissett (Ed.), Belief, Imagination, and Delusion (pp. 181-204). Oxford University PressOxford. DOI Scopus2
2024	Letheby, C., & Gerrans, P. (2024). Introduction: Philosophy and psychedelic psychiatry. In C. Letheby, & P. Gerrans (Eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Psychedelic Psychiatry (pp. 1-22). Oxford University Press. DOI
2024	Gerrans, P. (2024). The self as avatar: An active inference account of ego dissolution. In C. Letheby, & P. Gerrans (Eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Psychedelic Psychiatry (pp. 44-67). Oxford University Press. DOI
2024	Gerrans, P. (2024). DELUSION AND DREAMING. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion (pp. 361-375). Routledge. DOI
2023	Gerrans, P. (2023). An Active Inference Account of the Cotard Delusion of Inexistence. In A. Falcato, & J. Goncalves (Eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Delusions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (pp. 142-160). Routledge. DOI
2018	Gerrans, P. (2018). Painful memories. In K. Michaelian, D. Debus, & D. Perrin (Eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory (pp. 158-178). New York, NY; USA: Routledge. DOI Scopus3
2015	Gerrans, P. (2015). Passivity experience in schizophrenia. In R. Gennaro (Ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness (pp. 325-345). United States of America: MIT Press.
2014	Gerrans, P. (2014). Singular thoughts, seeing doubles and delusional misidentification. In A. Reboul (Ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan - Volume 2 (pp. 235-248). Switzerland: Springer. DOI
2009	Gerrans, P. (2009). Imitation and theory of mind. In G. Berntson, & J. Cacioppopp (Eds.), Handbook of neuroscience for the behavioral sciences (pp. 905-922). New Jersey, USA: Wiley.
2009	Gerrans, P. (2009). Mad scientists or unreliable autobiographers? Dopamine dysregulation and delusion. In M. Broome, & L. Bortolotti (Eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical perspectives (1 ed., pp. 151-172). New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
2009	Gerrans, P. (2009). From phenomenology to cognitive architecture and back. In T. Bayne, & J. Fernandez (Eds.), Delusion and self-deception. Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief formation (pp. 127-138). United States: Psychology Press. DOI Scopus1 WoS1
2008	Gerrans, P. (2008). Montesquieu's anti-utopian political theory. In John West Sooby (Ed.), Nowhere is perfect: French and francophone utopias/dystopias (pp. 11-26). Australia: University of Delaware Press.
2003	Gerrans, P., & McGeer, V. (2003). Theory of mind in autism and schizophrenia: A case of overoptimistic reverse engineering. In B. Repacholi, & V. Slaughter (Eds.), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development (pp. 269-302). Psychology Press. DOI Scopus2
2003	Gerrans, P., & McGeer, V. (2003). Theory of mind in autism and schizophrenia: a case of over-optimistic reverse engineering. In B. Repacholi, & V. Slaughter (Eds.), Individual differences in theory of mind - implications for typical and atypical development (pp. 271-304). 27 Church Rd, Hove, East Sussex BN3 2FA: Psychology Press.

Conference Papers

Year	Citation
2016	Gerrans, P. S. (2016). The Default Mode Network and the cognitive architecture of belief fixation. A new approach to the one stage -two stage debate about delusion formation. In INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY Vol. 51 (pp. 88). ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD.
2006	Gerrans, P. (2006). A neurocomputational model of delusion. In R. Manzotti (Ed.), Proceedings of BICS 06 (pp. CDROM1-CDROM9). CDROM: Interdisciplinary Research Canada.

Current Higher Degree by Research Supervision (University of Adelaide)

Date	Role	Research Topic	Program	Degree Type	Student Load	Student Name
2025	Co-Supervisor	The Physical Basis of Consciousness	Doctor of Philosophy	Doctorate	Full Time	Prof Keith Dear
2024	Principal Supervisor	Active Inference and Psychiatry	Master of Philosophy	Master	Full Time	Mr Samuel Madsen
2024	Principal Supervisor	AI and Accountability: Transparency, Explainability, and Accounting for Responsibility Gaps	Doctor of Philosophy	Doctorate	Full Time	Mr Michael Lazarou

Past Higher Degree by Research Supervision (University of Adelaide)

Date	Role	Research Topic	Program	Degree Type	Student Load	Student Name
2020 - 2022	Co-Supervisor	Self-Deception and Wilful Ignorance: ‘Self-induced, purported ignorance?’	Master of Philosophy	Master	Part Time	Ms Margaret Leila Penhall-Jones
2020 - 2022	Principal Supervisor	To Blame or Not to Blame: Respect, Fittingness, and Standing	Master of Philosophy	Master	Full Time	Mr Henry Littleton Phillips
2020 - 2022	Principal Supervisor	Moral Agency	Master of Philosophy	Master	Part Time	Mr Timothy Nailer
2011 - 2013	Co-Supervisor	Understanding is Simulating: a Defence of Embodied Linguistic Comprehension	Master of Philosophy	Master	Full Time	Dr Christopher Edward Ross Letheby
2006 - 2013	Principal Supervisor	Moral Competence and the Psychopath	Master of Arts	Master	Part Time	Mr Matthew Tieu

Position: Professor
Phone: 83135297
Email: philip.gerrans@adelaide.edu.au
Fax: 83134341
Campus: North Terrace
Building: Napier, floor 7
Org Unit: School of Humanities